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Getting to Work:
Why Nobody Cares About E-Verify
(And Why They Should)
Juliet P. Stumpf*
Employment is traditionally conceptualized as a private contract between employer and
employee. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which prohibited
employers from knowingly hiring employees not authorized to work and required employers to
request evidence of work authorization, introduced the government into this private relationship as
an immigration enforcer and recast the employer as an immigration law gatekeeper. Today,
comprehensive immigration reform initiatives propose to implement a nationwide system called EVerify through which employers check employees’ work authorization via on-line government
databases. E-Verify unveils how the employment verification laws establish U.S. employees as a
class circumscribed by government authorization to work. More than IRCA, it increases the
presence of government in the establishment of the employment relationship for all employees,
regardless of citizenship status. E-Verify represents a contemporary example of a recurring
phenomenon in U.S. immigration law: the imposition of immigration enforcement costs on the
U.S. population as a whole. In pursuit of enforcement goals, E-Verify impacts significant
individual interests. It does so by creating a very small risk per individual of a harmful error, but
aggregates that risk across the working population. That small population-wide risk is paired
with greater risks that the harmful error will fall on a minority of the population, unsettling the
workplace’s potential for democratic integration.

* Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. This Article was inspired by a talk given at Lewis &
Clark Law School by Bruce Friedman, Senior Policy Advisor, Office for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties
of the Department of Homeland Security. I am grateful for helpful comments and conversations to
Tino Cuéllar, Bruce Friedman, Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Mary Holland, Margaret Hu, Jeffrey Kahn,
Stephen Lee, Matthew Lister, Jayesh Rathod, Jenny Roberts, David Rubenstein, Rick Su, and Michele
Waslin, as well as to participants at the UC Irvine Symposium “Persistent Puzzles in Immigration
Law,” Santa Clara Law School’s Social Justice Workshop, the 2011 Emerging Immigration Law
Scholars and Teachers Conference, and the Washburn University School of Law Symposium
“Breaching Borders-State Encroachment into the Federal Domain.” James Bartholomew, Angie
Ferrer, Hoshihito Kondo, and Melanie Rose provided invaluable research assistance. Special thanks to
Eric, Liam, and Kai.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Work is both venerated and despised. Capitalist and socialist systems
concern themselves with who controls the means of production, the fruits of
labor, and the regulation of the workplace. Paid work generates the income
employees use to sustain themselves and their family, obtain goods, and support
pastimes. Work also has social and personal meaning: it can communicate social
status, enmesh employees in social networks, inspire, demoralize, degrade, bore,
and frustrate. Work can be transformational,1 virtuous,2 or exploitative.3 In some

1. See generally VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
2005) (1929).
2. See MAXINE HONG KINGSTON, THE WOMAN WARRIOR: MEMOIRS OF A GIRLHOOD
AMONG GHOSTS 64 (1989) (“The sweat of hard work is not to be displayed. It is much more graceful
to appear favored by the gods.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-651, at 3 (1996) (“[T]he values of work
and family . . . form the foundation of America’s communities.”), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183,
2184. See generally Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
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settings (Washington, D.C., notoriously so; Portland, Oregon, reputedly not4),
what work we do defines who we are. “What do you do?” asks for much less than
the sum total of the activities you might be engaged in, and also more. It asks
where you work, at what, for whom, perhaps when and how, and what that means
for how you and the questioner will relate to one another after you’ve answered.
The workplace has been hailed—cautiously—as “the single most promising arena
of racial integration” in American society.5 All of this, however, depends upon
access to work. This Article is about how immigration law is changing the way
Americans gain access to the workplace. It is about the borderline between
employment and exclusion from the workplace.
Most of us tend to think of employment as a private agreement between
employer and employee.6 The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA) introduced immigration enforcement into this private relationship,
requiring employers to ask new employees to present documents showing identity
and authorization to work in the United States.7 IRCA is an immigration law,
targeted at and primarily affecting noncitizens. Yet IRCA, together with E-Verify,
an electronic system that uses online government databases to carry out IRCA’s
directive, places burdens on all U.S. employees, including U.S. citizens. E-Verify
electronically compares the documents every new employee presents to an
employer with information in the Social Security Administration (SSA) and
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) databases in order to identify
employees who lack work authorization. This Article explores the implications of
a strategy that engages the U.S. workplace and its inhabitants in the law
enforcement quest to target noncitizens present unlawfully.8
E-Verify is poised for nationwide implementation. It has been a cornerstone
of major immigration reform initiatives.9 In May 2011, the Supreme Court opened

No. 104-193, §§ 817, 852.
3. See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND
THE I.N.S. 8–9 (1992).
4. Portlandia: Farm (Broadway Video Entertainment broadcast Jan. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.ifc.com/videos/portlandia-portland-dream-of-the-90s.php (“Portland is a city where
young people go to retire.”).
5. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 9 (2003).
6. E.g., Employment, WIKIPEDIA (Oct. 8, 2011, 1:42 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Employment (“Employment is a contract between two parties, one being the employer and the other
being the employee.”) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 471 (5th ed. 1979)).
7. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101(b), 100 Stat.
3359, 3365–68 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2006)). But cf. infra notes 36–51 and accompanying
text (noting that immigration laws aimed at the workplace existed prior to 1986, but targeted
employees based on race or employers based on employment sector).
8. See Immigration Reform and Control Act §§ 3360–69.
9. E.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 21–22
(May 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/immigration_blueprint.pdf
(proposing phasing in mandatory use of E-Verify while strengthening some employee protections);
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the door for states to mandate that employers use the E-Verify system, with
restriction or revocation of the employer’s business license as the sanction for
failure to comply.10 The federal government requires most of its contractors to use
the system and nearly twenty states mandate that some or all of its employers use
E-Verify.11
Most scholarship on E-Verify has been devoted to its effect on noncitizens
and minorities: critiquing whether it works as intended,12 increases
discrimination,13 opens the door to state regulation of immigration,14 or disrupts
S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 302 (2007) (proposing implementation schedule for national use of E-Verify
by all employers); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (passed by
Senate, May 25, 2006).
10. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985–87 (2011).
11. See Table: States Requiring E-Verify, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13127#10 (last updated Nov. 4, 2011).
12. See Danielle M. Kidd, Note, E-Verify: Promoting Accountability and Transparency in Federal
Procurement through Electronic Employment Verification, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 829 (2011) (analyzing the costs
and benefits of the E-Verify program and concluding that its benefits outweigh the costs); Carl
Wohlleben, Note, E-Verify, A Piece of the Puzzle Not a Brick in the Wall: Why All U.S. Employers Should Be
Made to Use E-Verify, Just Not Yet, 36 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 137, 141 (2009) (describing
flaws in E-Verify and government attempts to improve the system); see also Amy Peck, E-Verify: The
Good, The Bad and the Unresolved, NEBRASKA LAWYER, Apr. 2011, at 15 (explaining that tentative
nonconfirmations and erroneous information are “still a way of life” when using E-Verify).
13. See WESTAT CORP., FINDINGS OF THE E-VERIFY PROGRAM EVALUATION, REPORT
SUBMITTED TO U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 235, 242, 250 (Dec. 2009), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/E-Verify/Final%20E-Verify%20Report%2012-16-09_2.pdf
[hereinafter WESTAT REPORT] (assessing the rates of discrimination by employers); see also Matthew
C. Arentsen, Comment, Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson: Employment Authorization Laws, States’
Rights, and Federal Preemption—An Informed Approach, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 375, 390–92 (2011)
(contending that state-mandated participation in E-Verify will not increase employment
discrimination); Kati L. Griffith, Discovering ‘Immployment’ Law: The Constitutionality of Subfederal
Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 417 (2011) (explaining that subfederal
laws expanding IRCA and mandating E-Verify “encourage employment discrimination because they
place extra burdens on employers and expand the use of E-Verify beyond what IRCA requires”);
Kidd, supra note 12, at 841–43 (arguing that E-Verify will not change the potential for discrimination);
Darcy M. Pottle, Note, Federal Employer Sanctions as Immigration Federalism, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 99,
116-19 (2010) (outlining the E-Verify program and noting that E-Verify’s “false negatives
disproportionately affect persons born outside of the United States”) (quoting Problems in the Current
Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement System:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. and Int’l Law of the H. Comm.on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 58 (2007)
(testimony of Marc Rosenblum, Dept. of Political Science, University of New Orleans)).
14. See generally Arentsen, supra note 13 (analyzing appellate decisions weighing preemption
challenges to state laws that mandate employer participation in the federal E-Verify program); Naomi
Barrowclough, E-Verify: Long Awaited ‘Magic Bullet’ or Weak Attempt to Substitute Technology for
Comprehensive Reform?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 791, 798–805 (2010) (evaluating the question of
nationalizing E-Verify in light of state integration or rejection of E-Verify); Rachel Feller, Preempting
State E-Verify Regulations: A Case Study of Arizona’s Improper Legislation in the Field of “Immigration-Related
Employment Practices,” 84 WASH. L. REV. 289 (2009) (arguing that Congress created and occupied a new
field of immigration-related employment practices that preempts state regulation); Mark S. Grube,
Note, Preemption of Local Regulations Beyond Lozano v. City of Hazleton: Reconciling Local Enforcement with
Federal Immigration Policy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 418–22 (2010) (analyzing E-Verify’s procedures
and enforcement in the context of conflict preemption); Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law:
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labor and employment protections for undocumented workers.15 This Article
takes a different path. It engages E-Verify as a contemporary example of a
recurring phenomenon in U.S. immigration law—the imposition of immigration
enforcement costs on the U.S. population as a whole. E-Verify is an immigration
enforcement program that will mandate participation from most of the working
population in the United States. Broad implementation of E-Verify may impose
actual and potential harms on that larger population through error, misuse,
discriminatory effect, or a decrease in individual autonomy.
With E-Verify, that threat is multifold. First, prior to their E-Verify database
check, all work-authorized employees will face a risk of finding themselves
erroneously barred from employment that is different in nature from the risk
under the current I-9 Form-based system. The second risk is that government
agencies whose databases E-Verify relies on may use their new access to
employment information in undesirable, liberty-constraining ways. E-Verify
introduces the Department of Homeland Security, an agency with a national
security and law enforcement agenda, into the employment process as a decision
maker. That raises concerns that the agency may use the information about
employees that E-Verify receives for its own primary mission.
These risks are universal. They are faced by all employees, regardless of
citizenship or immigration status. Added to these individual risks are structural
risks. Widespread use of E-Verify may change the nature of the workplace in
unexpected and uncomfortable ways.
Understanding the impact of E-Verify on the mainstream U.S. employee is
important for three reasons. First, it has the potential to change the current
discourse on immigration enforcement and reform by changing public
perspectives on modern immigration enforcement strategies. When immigration
enforcement affects citizens, even in small ways, citizens have reason to pay
attention to issues that affect noncitizens. Policymakers considering expansion of
E-Verify and courts considering challenges to it must take into account the liberty
interests of the ordinary citizen.

What States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 471–74 (2008)
(advocating state implementation of mandatory E-Verify use laws); Jaime Walter, Comment,
Congressional Preemption of Work-Authorization Verification Laws: A Narrower Approach to Defining the Scope of
Preemption, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 289 (2010) (arguing that local statutes mandating work-authorization
verification should succumb to field preemption).
15. See David Bacon & Bill Ong Hing, The Rise and Fall of Employer Sanctions, 38 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 77, 87–89, 91–92 (2010) (describing barriers to worker organizing and assertion of
employment protections resulting from IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions and SSA database
checks); Griffith, supra note 13, at 392, 441–49 (considering “the preemptive force of two baseline
federal employment laws: the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964”); Lora L. Ries, B-Verify: Transforming E-Verify into a Biometric Employment Verification
System, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 271, 285–86 (2010) (analyzing the E-Verify system’s potential for
employer misuse).
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Second, protecting the interests of the majority can enhance protection of
minority interests when those interests overlap.16 If the liberty interests of
mainstream U.S. employees converge with those of noncitizens or employees of
color, interest-convergence theory suggests that courts will pay more attention to
those interests.17 If E-Verify, in its mission to deter employment of
undocumented workers, interferes with the ability of mainstream employees to get
and keep jobs or otherwise diminishes the quality of the work experience,
mainstream employees begin to share a common interest with undocumented
workers or employees of color who experience discrimination. That common
interest, held by a large majority, will attract the attention of both courts and
policymakers.
Finally, examining the interplay between the impact of E-Verify on
mainstream employees and undocumented workers sheds light on how E-Verify
could fundamentally change the nature of the workplace. E-Verify’s growing
implementation expands the regulation of employees by federal agencies, law
enforcement, and state actors. E-Verify introduces the DHS, an agency with a
mission very different from labor regulation, into the establishment of the
employment relationship. It creates room for states to play a larger role in
immigration enforcement and employment when they mandate that employers use
the E-Verify system and place state sanctions on failure to comply.
This Article explores the concern that policymakers and courts at the
national or the state level will ignore or, at best, discount these diffuse,
unquantifiable risks. Failing to understand how E-Verify could affect the liberty
interests of employees will impoverish the discussion about whether to implement
E-Verify on a national level. Added to this is the strong perception that E-Verify
is purely an immigration enforcement program, despite its application to all
employees. These barriers raise the likelihood that diffuse liberty interests will be
traded away by policymakers for what are perceived as more concrete benefits in
the form of stronger immigration enforcement and deterrence of unlawful
migration.
Part II of this Article lays out a history of employment law as a backdrop for
IRCA and E-Verify. It briefly describes the E-Verify system and locates it in a
uniquely delicate moment: the inception of employment. Part III describes the
challenge for democratic institutions of properly evaluating the nationwide
adoption of a program that has benefits for a majority but disproportionately
burdens a minority. It lays out several critiques of the E-Verify system. Part IV

16. Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Reliving and Learning from Our Racial History, 66
U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 22 (2004) (describing the interest-convergence theory).
17. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59
DUKE L.J. 1723, 1728 (2010) (explaining several ways in which unauthorized migrants may assert
“oblique versions of rights that U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents can exercise in the same
settings”).
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analyzes the increased role that E-Verify establishes for the federal and state
governments in the creation of the employment relationship and the ways that EVerify changes the relationship between employers, employees, and applicants. It
evaluates whether the majoritarian interest in greater liberty has the potential to
collaterally protect the interests of the more vulnerable minority of employees
who will suffer the greatest harms18 upon the national application of E-Verify.
II. CROSSING THE BORDERLINE: ACCESS TO WORK
E-Verify and the employer sanctions laws represent the coming together of
two historical approaches to employment. The first is the traditional conception of
at-will employment operating within a relatively private employer-employee
relationship. Coexisting with the at-will tradition is the history of government
restrictions on access to the workplace for noncitizens, women, and ethnic and
racial minorities. This Part will illustrate how IRCA’s employer sanctions
provisions and E-Verify straddle these approaches, applying to the mainstream
U.S. workforce the enforcement tools shaped through government efforts to
restrict access to employment on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, and
citizenship status.
A. Two Employment Histories
1. At-Will Employment
The traditional history of employment law in the United States traces the
establishment of a powerful form of private contract as the mainstay of the
employment relationship. The foundation of U.S. employment law has been the
doctrine of at-will employment, which theorizes a private agreement between two
relatively equal parties from which either party may withdraw at any time and for
any reason.19

18. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (“The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”); see also Cynthia Lee, Cultural
Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 914, 959 (2007)
(applying this theory to cultural defense claims of minority and immigrant defendants and concluding
that these defendants are “more likely to receive accommodation when there is convergence between
[American] cultural norms and [their] cultural norms”).
19. Plona v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 558 F.3d 478, 481 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he employmentat-will doctrine . . . permits an employer to terminate an at-will employment relationship ‘for any
cause, at any time whatsoever, even if done in gross or reckless disregard of [an] employee’s rights.’”
(quoting Painter v. Graley, 639 N.E.2d 51, 55 (Ohio 1994))); Johnson v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d
808, 810 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that under the employment-at-will doctrine “both employers and
employees are free to end the employment relationship at any time, and for any reason, without
liability”); Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract, 29 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 345, 350–51 (2008) (describing at-will employment); see also Julie C. Suk, Discrimination
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The development of the at-will doctrine during the Industrial Revolution
originally endowed employees with the freedom to quit.20 Over time, however, the
at-will doctrine came to entrench an employer’s freedom to fire its employees.
Scholars have roundly critiqued the imprimatur that the at-will doctrine places on
discharge without good cause because it tips the balance of power heavily in favor
of the employer.21
At-will employment relies on the relative absence of public regulation of
hiring and firing. Judicial forbearance, in the absence of a clear statement, from
enforcing contracts that restrict firing an employee exemplifies this reluctance to
govern the employment relationship.22 When law does act affirmatively to regulate
employment, it is often characterized as an intrusion. For example, employment
discrimination law emerged as an inroad into at-will employment, prohibiting
employers from relying on race or membership in other protected classes when
taking adverse employment actions.23

at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 78–80
(2007) (describing at-will employment and exceptions to the general rule).
20. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Dismissal Law in the United States: The Past and Present of At-Will
Employment, INT’L COLLABORATIVE ON SOC. EUR. 2–4 (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342667 (describing the inception of the at-will doctrine during the
Industrial Revolution as a move away from the “entire-contract doctrine” which penalized agricultural
employees who left employment prior to the end of the harvest).
21. E.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1406 (1967) (“It is the fear of being discharged
which above all else renders the great majority of employees vulnerable to employer coercion.”);
Marion Crain, Arm’s-Length Intimacy: Employment As Relationship, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 163, 166
(2011) (reasoning that “the vast majority of individual workers lack the bargaining leverage or
knowledge of their rights necessary to protect their investment by negotiating for job security”); contra
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (advocating for repeal of discrimination laws in favor of a return to
freedom of contract and individual autonomy). See also James E. Macdonald & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley,
A Natural Law Defense to the Employment Law Question: A Response to Richard Epstein, 38 AM. BUS. L.J.
363, 367, 375 (2001) (listing sources taking both sides of the question).
22. See Ziegler v. Findlay Indus., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 733, 742 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (explaining
that “the mere inclusion of a . . . term [of years]” in an employment contract is not enough to
overcome the “strong presumption of at-will employment unless the terms of the contract clearly
indicate otherwise” (citing Henkel v. Educ. Research Council, 344 N.E.2d 118 (Ohio 1976))).
23. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1655, 1655 (1996) (explaining that “[t]he employer’s presumptive right to fire employees at will—for
good reason, for bad reason, or for no reason at all—has been drastically cut back in the last sixty
years” and that the “at-will rule now coexists with numerous important exceptions—statutory and
common law, state and federal—that prohibit . . . discrimination based on race, sex, age, or other
characteristics.”); Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 66 (2000) (noting that at-will employment is a “fundamental
assumption [that] has shaped our labor law”); see also Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The
Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653 (2000) (arguing that the expansion of modern tort
law is gradually eviscerating at-will employment in America).
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2. Coerced Labor and Barriers to Work
Despite the rise in prominence of the at-will doctrine, U.S. law has always
closely regulated access to work.24 Juxtaposed with the at-will realm of
employment law were laws that channeled employment by means of racial, ethnic,
gender-based, and citizenship status restrictions. Regulation of employment in the
United States has tended to take the form either of requiring work or of denying
entry to the workplace. In perspective, then, the at-will realm of freedom from
government regulation of employment turned out to be a space bounded by legal
restrictions and obligations that were racial, ethnic, and gendered. It also was, and
remains, tightly bounded by citizenship and immigration law.
Coerced work hearkens as far back as the colonial era, when laws
institutionalizing slavery systematized the forced migration and dehumanization of
African25 and Native American26 peoples in order to provide labor for the project
of white settlement of the new landscape. Early European migration to the United
States relied heavily on indentured servitude, through which migrants paid off
their passage by working under an enforceable contract for a term of years, after
which they became free to contract their own labor.27 After the Civil War, the
Black Codes in most postbellum states imposed on freed blacks a legal obligation
to work on pain of arrest. These laws authorized the sheriff to hire out the
arrested freedman to white landowners.28
Denying access to the workplace was not uncommon. In 1908, the Supreme
Court confirmed that states could restrict women from working in a range of
occupations and conditions because the performance of the “maternal function[ ]”

24. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING 21–26 (2006) (laying out a history of
restrictive federal and state immigration laws); see, e.g., Coolie Trade Law, Act of Feb. 19, 1862, ch. 27,
12 Stat. 340 (1862) (barring transportation of Chinese citizens “as servants or apprentices, or to be
held to service or labor”).
25. See Rhonda V. Magee, Slavery As Immigration?, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 273, 278–82 (2009); Kerry
Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1353 (2009).
26. E.g., Gregory Ablavsky, Comment, Making Indians “White”: The Judicial Abolition of Native
Slavery in Revolutionary Virginia and Its Racial Legacy, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1457, 1463–67 (2011)
(describing the history of Native American enslavement in the colonies). See generally INDIAN
SLAVERY IN COLONIAL AMERICA (Alan Gallay ed., 2009) (studying Indian slavery from various
perspectives).
27. See Alfred L. Brophy, Law and Indentured Servitude in Mid-Eighteenth Century Pennsylvania, 28
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 69, 85–90 (1991); Bradley J. Nicholson, Reflections on Capitalism, Property, and the
Law of Slavery, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 151, 172–75 (2002).
28. See, e.g., 1866 Va. Acts 91–92, ch. 28 (defining “vagrant” broadly to include former slaves
and providing that a justice shall “order [a] vagrant to be employed in labor for any term not
exceeding three months, and . . . to be hired out for the best wages that can be procured”); 1865 S.C.
Acts 284–85, ch. 96–98 (1865) (declaring that a convicted vagrant may “be hired for such wages as
can be obtained for his services, to any owner or lessee of a farm, for the term of hard labor to which
he was sentenced”); see Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV. 409, 419
(2011) (locating the Black Codes within a larger context of involuntary labor).
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made women the “object of public interest and care in order to preserve the
strength and vigor of the race.”29
More recent immigration law has its own examples of both compulsory labor
and denial of access to the workplace. The Bracero Program, negotiated with
Mexico in 1942, facilitated the migration of temporary Mexican contract laborers
and conditioned the right to remain in the United States on continuing
employment.30 Today, the United States conditions the validity of most temporary
employment visas on a continuing employment relationship.31 When the job ends,
the noncitizen becomes unlawfully present.32 While this is a far cry from
indentured servitude, the threat of deportation as a consequence of quitting or
being fired introduces an element of coercion into the relationship between
employer and noncitizen employee.
Immigration law has been marked not only by affirmative obligations to
work, but also by government restriction on access to employment. In 1882, the
first Chinese Exclusion Act imposed a ten-year ban on the immigration of Chinese
laborers.33 The 1885 Contract Labor Law denied entry to noncitizens seeking to

29. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1907); see also id. at 422 (explaining that “her physical
structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions—having in view not merely her own
health, but the well-being of the race—justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the
passion of man” and thus “[t]he limitations which this statute places upon her contractual powers,
upon her right to agree with her employer as to the time she shall labor, are not imposed solely for
her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of all”); Alice Kessler-Harris, Legal Theory & Gendered
History, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 125, 129–30 (2010) (locating Muller v. Oregon in the context of
historical ideas of individual liberty and contrasting the application of liberty to men and women).
30.
See Agreement Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting the
Temporary Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers, Aug. 4, 1942, 56 Stat. 1759, 1768; Agreement
Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting the Recruiting of Mexican NonAgricultural Workers, April 29, 1943, 57 Stat. 1353, 1357; see also CALAVITA, supra note 4, at 19–25
(providing historical context on the bilateral agreement on temporary migration for Mexican
agricultural workers).
31. See Peter H. Schuck & John E. Tyler, Making the Case for Changing U.S. Policy Regarding
Highly Skilled Immigrants, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 327, 342 (2010) (noting that for H-1B visa holders,
after the visa term expires “or if the worker leaves the original sponsoring employer and does not get
new sponsorship, he or she must leave the country” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a), (n))).
32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (2011) (defining “aliens unlawfully present”); e.g., Tapis Int’l v.
INS, 94 F. Supp. 2d 172, 174 (D. Mass. 2000) (pointing out that the immigration agency’s denial of
petition to renew temporary H-1B employment visa subjected the noncitizen employee and his wife
to potential removal from the United States).
33. The Chinese Exclusion Acts include: Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed
1943) (suspending immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States for ten years); Scott Act, ch.
1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888) (repealed 1943) (prohibiting Chinese laborers from returning to the United
States after departure); Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892) (repealed 1943) (extending the ban on
Chinese laborers); McCreary Act, ch. 14, § 2, 28 Stat. 7 (1893) (repealed 1943) (defining laborers to
include merchants, laundry owners, miners, and fishers); Act of Apr. 27, 1904, ch. 1630, 33 Stat. 392,
428 (repealed 1943) (reenacting and extending Acts without limitation); see also Act of Dec. 17, 1943,
ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600, 600–01 (repealing the Chinese Exclusion Acts).
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enter the United States if they arrived having previously contracted to work.34 For
a long time, lawful admission to the United States has been predicated on a federal
determination of a need for foreign labor as well as a private offer of
employment.35
3. Regulating Access to At-Will Employment: IRCA and E-Verify
In 1986, the separate worlds of at-will employment for mainstream
employees and restricted access to employment for noncitizens and other outsider
groups merged. Until then, the law permitted employers to hire noncitizens
unlawfully present in the United States.36 Congress passed IRCA in 1986 as part of
an overhaul of the immigration laws.37 IRCA placed employers in the role of
private immigration law screeners. It imposed on employers an obligation to
request documents showing the employee’s identity and authorization to work
from each new hire. It also required employers to refrain from hiring applicants
unable to produce those documents.38
For the first time, IRCA barred employers from hiring employees within the
United States whom the government had not authorized to work.39 Ten years
later, Congress mandated the creation of a pilot program for electronic verification
of employment eligibility, now known as E-Verify.40

34. Alien Contract Labor Law, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (1885) codified and amended by 8 U.S.C. §
141 (1946) (repealed 1952); EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1798–1965, at 88–89 (1981).
35. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(5)) (restricting admission of certain classes of employees based on the Department of Labor’s
certification that there are insufficient qualified U.S. workers available to perform the job at the
prevailing wage); id. § 203(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)) (listing preferences for employmentbased permanent immigration); id. § 101(a)(15) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)) (listing
temporary visas including those providing temporary lawful presence for work-related reasons); see
also Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 531–41(2007) (describing
the inception of employment-based restrictions on immigration and the role of labor unions in that
shift). See generally KITTY CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE CONTROL OF LABOR: 1820–
1924 (1984) (offering a comprehensive history).
36. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, §274(a), 66 Stat. 163,
228–29 (1952), amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1986) (enacting the “Texas Proviso,” which exempted
employment of unauthorized workers from the crime of harboring an unauthorized alien); see also
Daniel J. Tichenor, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA 194
(2002) (describing the history of employer sanctions laws).
37. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986)
(amending the Immigration and Nationality Act) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a); see Stephen Lee,
Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1105–07 (2009).
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2006).
39. Id. § 1324a(a) (prohibiting employment of noncitizens without employment authorization);
see Motomura, supra note 17, at 1760 (setting out a brief history of employer sanctions laws).
40. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L.
No. 104–208, div. C, § 401(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-655 (1996); see also Chamber of Commerce v.
Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 752 (10th Cir. 2010) (describing the history of the Basic Pilot program
that later became E-Verify).
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IRCA imposed lawful immigration status as a new hiring criterion. While
professional licensing requirements and felon disqualification laws had previously
restricted access to certain professions and jobs, IRCA made a much more
sweeping change. In requiring employers to verify that the government authorized
the employee to work, IRCA established a permanent and public restriction on
what most perceived as a private employer-employee contract. The law relocated
the concept of government authorization to work from its roots in historical
subordination and immigration control to the mainstream employment realm.41
B. Navigating E-Verify
Understanding the role of E-Verify in changing the nature of the workplace
requires some knowledge of how the system works. The E-Verify system adds an
electronic component to IRCA’s paper-based process for verifying the work
authorization of new hires by means of a federal form. In essence, the employer
enters into a computer certain information from each employee’s identity and
work authorization documents.42 Through the Internet, the E-Verify program
attempts to match the employee’s information to government databases
maintained by the Social Security Administration (SSA) and DHS.43 If there is a
match, the computer informs the employer that the new hire is authorized to
work.44 If there is either no match or a mismatch between the information the
employer submitted and data in the government database, the system will return a
“tentative non-confirmation,” also known as a “TNC.”45
At that point, the E-Verify system relies on the employer to provide the
employee with a notice of the lack of employment eligibility confirmation along
with instructions to contact a government agency to address the issue.46 If neither
the SSA nor DHS can confirm the employee’s authorization to work, E-Verify will
issue a notice to the employer of a “final nonconfirmation.”47 E-Verify will also
return a final nonconfirmation or a “DHS No Show” notice if the employee does
not contact the government within eight federal work days of E-Verify’s issuance

41. See Stone, supra note 20, at 6 (describing a “dual labor market, comprised of insiders—
usually white, blue collar men in unionized firms—and outsiders—usually women, minorities, migrant
workers and rural Americans[ ] ” left out of the more stable employment sectors).
42. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, E-VERIFY USER MANUAL FOR
EMPLOYERS, 15–17 (2011), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Verification/E-Verify/EVerify_Native_Documents/manual-employer_comp.pdf [hereinafter E-VERIFY USER MANUAL].
43. Id. at 4.
44. Id. at 22.
45. Id. at 25; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-146, EMPLOYMENT
VERIFICATION: FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE E-VERIFY, BUT
SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES REMAIN 8–11 (2010) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (detailing
circumstances under which E-Verify will issue a tentative nonconfirmation in response to the
information that the employer has provided).
46. E-VERIFY USER MANUAL, supra note 42, at 27–38.
47. GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 9.
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of a tentative nonconfirmation notice to the employer.48 There is no formal
process to appeal a final nonconfirmation.49
Upon receiving the final nonconfirmation, the employer is expected to
terminate the new hire’s employment.50 If the employer continues to employ the
individual after a final nonconfirmation, the employer is presumed to be
knowingly employing an undocumented worker.51
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the primary agency that
manages the program, characterizes E-Verify as largely voluntary.52 The
authorizing legislation describes it as a pilot program with a four-year sunset,53
though Congress has extended that expiration date.54 Nevertheless, mandatory
participation is on the rise. While the federal government has not required private
employers to participate in E-Verify, it is mandatory in federal government hiring
and for most federal contractors.55 Many states have joined Arizona in requiring
employers, public and private, to use E-Verify.56 Employers not subject to these
federal and state requirements may choose whether to use E-Verify or continue to
implement IRCA’s paper-based employment verification requirements.
Regardless of the extent of employer choice to use E-Verify, representing EVerify as a voluntary program is inaccurate in an important respect. Participation

48. E-VERIFY USER MANUAL, supra note 42, at 45–47.
49. Id. at 39.
50. GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 13–14.
51. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L.
No. 104-208, div. C, § 403(a)(4)(C)(iii), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-655 to -665 (1996) (“If the person or
other entity continues to employ (or to recruit or refer) an individual after receiving final
nonconfirmation, a rebuttable presumption is created that the person or entity has violated [the
employer sanctions provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A)].”); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, The E-Verify Program For Employment Verification Memorandum of Understanding,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 4 (2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/EVerify/Customer %20Support/Employer%20MOU%20(September%202009).pdf [hereinafter
E-VERIFY MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING] (enumerating the obligations of the Department
of Homeland Security, the Social Security Administration, and the employer, and stating that “the
Employer is subject to a rebuttable presumption that it has knowingly employed an unauthorized
alien . . . if the Employer continues to employ an employee after receiving a final nonconfirmation”);
see also GAO REPORT supra note 45, at 13–14.
52. E-VERIFY USER MANUAL, supra note 42, at 4; see also IIRIRA § 402(a) (stating that “any
person or other entity that conducts any hiring (or recruitment or referral) in a State in which a pilot
program is operating may elect to participate in that pilot program” and, “[e]xcept as specifically
provided . . . , the Attorney General may not require any person or other entity to participate in a pilot
program”).
53. IIRIRA §§ 401–04.
54. See Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-156, 117
Stat. 1944, 1944–45; Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 755, 755–56
(extending E-Verify to September 2009); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83 123 Stat. 2142 (2009) (approving three-year extension to 2012).
55. See GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 2 (citing Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) subpt.
22.18).
56. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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is involuntary for the population most likely to experience its shortfalls:
employees. E-Verify employers must verify all new hires through the program,
leaving no room for employees to opt out.
This requirement exists both to ensure that employers use E-Verify for
employees with questionable work authorization and to discourage discriminatory
use.57 It prohibits employers from selectively verifying only certain employees due
to an employer’s suspicion, based on perceived race, ethnicity, immigration status,
national origin, or any other factor, that an employee may not be eligible to
work.58 It is also meant to increase compliance with employment verification laws
by making it more difficult for employers to hire employees who are not
authorized to work.59
Nevertheless, the requirement that employers screen all new hires means that
employees cannot avoid any shortcomings of the program. E-Verify has a number
of safeguards to protect work-authorized employees from improper termination
and discrimination. An employer is statutorily barred from firing an employee
because of a tentative nonconfirmation of the employee’s eligibility to work.60 Nor
may employers use the system to prescreen applicants prior to hire.61 The law
does not, however, specify any means of enforcing these safeguards.
C. The Difference E-Verify Makes
E-Verify represents a significant step beyond IRCA in entrenching
immigration enforcement in the workplace. When IRCA divided U.S. employees
into groups according to work authorization, it destabilized the conception of a
private realm of employment contract but largely left the employer in the driver’s
seat in enforcing that division. IRCA imbued the employer with the gatekeeping
role of screening new hires, a function previously reserved to immigration
57. IIRIRA § 404(d)(4) (requiring “reasonable safeguards against . . . unlawful discriminatory
practices based on national origin or citizenship status”).
58. Id. § 404(d)(4) (requiring the system to “have reasonable safeguards against the system’s
resulting in unlawful discriminatory practices based on national origin or citizenship status,
including—(A) the selective or unauthorized use of the system to verify eligibility; (B) the use of the
system prior to an offer of employment; or (C) the exclusion of certain individuals from consideration
for employment as a result of a perceived likelihood that additional verification will be required,
beyond what is required for most job applicants”); E-VERIFY MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING,
supra note 51, at 4–5.
59. IIRIRA § 404(d)(4) (requiring safeguards against discrimination); Marc R. Rosenblum, EVerify: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Proposals for Reform, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 5 (2011), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/e-verify-insight.pdf (explaining that “E-Verify strengthens
immigration enforcement” by detecting the most common fraudulent identification documents).
60. IIRIRA § 403(a)(4)(B)(iii) (“In no case shall an employer terminate employment of an
individual because of a failure of the individual to have identity and work eligibility confirmed under
this section until a nonconfirmation becomes final. Nothing in this clause shall apply to a termination
of employment for any reason other than because of such a failure.”); E-VERIFY MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 51, at 5.
61. E-VERIFY MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 51, at 4.
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enforcement officials.62 As a result, the face of immigration enforcement in the
workplace––the employer’s face––remained largely private and entirely familiar.
Although the existence of the legal prohibition and the threat of agency audits and
raids may have influenced employer decision-making, the employer alone made
the decision that mattered at the moment of hire, determining whether the work
authorization documents were genuine on their face.
E-Verify, in contrast, relegated the employer to the role of copilot to
immigration officials in enforcing immigration law in the workplace. E-Verify
delegates to the employer the ministerial function of gathering documents from
the employee, feeding the information into the agency databases, and delivering
the agency’s notice of failure to confirm employment eligibility. At the same time,
E-Verify channels the employer’s greatest power, the power to discharge, to serve
the ends of immigration control.
In this way, E-Verify has made visible the Cheshire Cat of government
control over work authorization. E-Verify unveils the way that the employment
verification laws articulated a government power to endow employees with
permission to work. Like the Cheshire Cat, this power remains present even when
out of sight.63 By making each new hire contingent on an individualized inquiry to
agency databases, E-Verify reveals U.S. employees to themselves as a class
circumscribed by government authorization to work.
III. THE BENEFITS AND FLAWS OF E-VERIFY
This Part examines the impact of E-Verify on mainstream employees. It
begins by evaluating the benefits that E-Verify proffers to civil society in the
United States. It then evaluates two central flaws: the failure to verify the
employment eligibility of a proportion of employees who are authorized to work,
and the disparate impact of E-Verify errors on noncitizens of color, women, and
naturalized citizens. E-Verify offers some benefits to the majority at a small risk
per capita of some loss of liberty and a higher risk to certain minority employees
of experiencing greater individual losses.
A. Benefits of E-Verify
In passing IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions and mandating the
development of E-Verify, Congress intended to confer on U.S. society a more
effective form of immigration control and also reduce discrimination based on

62. Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 887, 940–41 (2006) (outlining the gatekeeping function that IRCA placed on employers
and noting that both employers and undocumented employees have incentives to subvert good-faith
compliance with employment verification programs).
63. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 72–73 (S. MICHELLE
WIGGINS illust., 1983).
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perceptions of foreign appearance and accent.64 An effective employment
eligibility verification regime would identify employees who were not authorized
to work while accurately confirming the employment eligibility of U.S. citizens and
work-authorized noncitizens.
1. Identifying Undocumented Employees
The USCIS website advertises E-Verify as a more accurate and efficient way
for employers to determine the eligibility of their employees to work in the United
States and “the best way employers can ensure a legal workforce.”65 A fully workauthorized workforce would reduce the perceived need for workplace raids
involving armed immigration agents, mass arrests, and criminal and civil
prosecutions.66 It would also relieve the downward pressure on employee
protections that the existence and availability of a malleable supply of
undocumented employees creates.
E-Verify’s capacity to affect these benefits by identifying employees who lack
work authorization has attracted frequent critique.67 In a nutshell, the system
oververifies by confirming as eligible for employment numerous employees who
are not. Between April and June of 2008, E-Verify confirmed as work-authorized
approximately 54% of employees who in fact were not authorized to work, or
5.8% of the workers screened.68 E-Verify is currently unable to detect when an
employee uses valid documents that are stolen or borrowed, or when an employer
uses a work-authorized employee’s documents to verify another employee with
questionable work eligibility.69

64. IIRIRA § 403 (setting out pilot program purpose and requirements); § 404(d)(4) (requiring
“reasonable safeguards against . . . unlawful discriminatory practices based on national origin or
citizenship status”).
65. E-Verify, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.dhs.gov/e-verify
(last visited Nov. 15, 2011); see also Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach
to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 157 (2008) (asserting that E-Verify will cause
undocumented immigrants to “self-deport”).
66. Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1091, 1098–100 (2008) (noting that some companies decided to use E-Verify to
avoid immigration raids, yet warrants for immigration raids “are often issued based on flawed
information contained in databases” that underlie E-Verify); Kevin R. Lashus et. al., Fear the ICE Man:
Lessons from the Swift Raids to Warm You Up—The New Government Perspective on Employer Sanctions, 32
NOVA L. REV. 391, 398–401 (2008) (evaluating the belief that E-Verify participation will reduce the
prevalence of ICE workplace raids and concluding that E-Verify may increase the likelihood of raids).
67. See e.g., Pottle, supra note 13, at 117–20 (critiquing the efficacy of the system’s ability to
identify undocumented new hires and describing other scholarly critiques).
68. WESTAT REPORT, supra note 13; accord Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 6 (citing id.); GAO
REPORT, supra note 45, at 3 (stating that “E-Verify could not detect identity fraud in the majority of
cases where unauthorized workers presented their employers with valid documents that were stolen
or borrowed” (citing WESTAT REPORT, supra note 14)).
69. Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 5; GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 3.
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To date, most proposals to increase the effectiveness of E-Verify and
maximize the intended benefit of a fully work-authorized workforce also
marginally increase burdens on U.S. employees. Some have suggested the use of
biometric data to allow the computer to match each individual employee with the
information on her documents and in government databases.70 The biometric
approach, at its simplest, would use photographs, fingerprints, retinal data, DNA,
or some combination of that data, to match the individual with the information in
the system.71 Another approach would allow work-authorized employees to lock
their Social Security number within the E-Verify system to prevent fraudulent use
of that number.72 Whether these burdens are justified depends on how heavy the
costs are to U.S. employees as well as whether E-Verify can realize its other
promised benefits.
Moreover, E-Verify will succeed only by requiring or inspiring employers to
cooperate with its mandates. Employers may, through error or intent, undermine
E-Verify’s goals by declining to discharge identified undocumented employees or
by failing to check all new employees through the system.73 USCIS has taken some
measures to prevent this, including hiring monitoring and compliance staff and
initiating the development of data analysis programs to detect employer fraud and
noncompliance.74 If employers fail to terminate employees who receive a final
nonconfirmation of their authorization to work, enforcement lies with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).75
A full evaluation of the success of these compliance efforts is beyond the
scope of this article, but a few stumbling blocks are of note. First, the role of the
employer as immigration enforcer will at times conflict with the profit-driven
70. GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 24 (describing the proposal as well as concerns about
design costs, equipment costs and access to the technology for employers, and privacy and civil
liberties of employees); Ries, supra note 15, at 271, 273 (“A biometric employment eligibility
verification system can shift much of the burden and decision making from the employers to the
federal government, creating a simpler and more accurate system for employers to use, while also
eliminating the discrimination issues that emerged over the past two decades.”).
71. See Ries, supra note 15, at 303.
72. GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 23.
73. See Manns, supra note 62, at 967 (“[E]mployers could simply choose not to use the
databases, ignore the databases’ negative responses, or tacitly or explicitly ask prospective employees
to come up with other identity information . . . when there are doubts about the authenticity of
identification materials. Employers might have incentives to serve merely as gatekeepers of their own
self-interest in detecting potential violators, so that the information of undocumented aliens would
not be processed into the verification system. So long as employers stand to gain from employing
undocumented aliens and face a low risk of direct monitoring of noncompliance, they can be
expected to continue to subvert their duties.”).
74. See GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 24–29 (detailing attempts to improve employer
compliance); see also Manns, supra note 62, at 944–60 (proposing private monitoring of the employer’s
compliance with its immigration gatekeeping duty).
75. Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Regarding E-Verify Program Information Sharing 2–3 (2008).
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interest of employers when that interest favors hiring undocumented employees.76
Second, the enforcement history of the employer sanctions laws prior to E-Verify
generated criticism that it was insufficient and underprioritized, and it is unclear
how that would change with a nationalized E-Verify.77 Finally, in its current
embodiment, participation in E-Verify is voluntary for most private employers.
The success of the program depends on whether employers perceive a benefit to
using E-Verify and continue to use it. If USCIS too readily reports to ICE its
suspicions about noncompliant employers, it may chill the participation of
employers unwilling to expose themselves to the enforcement arm of immigration
control and who are unlikely to attract ICE’s attention otherwise. To the extent
that USCIS wants the program to succeed, it may lean toward conservatively
reporting suspicions of employer misuse.
2. Reducing Discrimination
There is some evidence that E-Verify reduces conscious discrimination
against employees based on citizenship status, ethnicity, or national origin. EVerify usually provides an answer to the question of whether a new employee is
authorized to work. That answer appeases the uncertainty that some employers
have felt about hiring employees whose ethnicity or noncitizen status they
associated with unauthorized migration. According to a 2009 governmentcommissioned study, more employers said that using E-Verify increased their
willingness to hire noncitizens than said using E-Verify made them less willing to
hire noncitizens.78 Presumably, that greater willingness could lead to lower levels
of discrimination on the basis of both citizenship status and ethnicity.79
B. E-Verify and Its Flaws
E-Verify’s most acclaimed advantages are also the source of its greatest
flaws. In the course of identifying employees without work authorization, EVerify erroneously identifies employees as not authorized to work in ways that
create disparate impacts on employees.
76. See Lee, supra note 37, at 1107.
77. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, infra note 7; see also Lee, supra note 37,
at 1103 (explaining why some level of cooperation between employer and immigration enforcement
officials benefits both, in that the relationship between employer and DHS “can often be highly
collaborative and mutually beneficial, where the DHS overlooks employer indiscretions in exchange
for help identifying potentially removable immigrants”). In 2008, ICE conducted 503 employer
payroll audits. See Rosenblum, supra note 68, at 10 n.41 (citing ICE Worksite Enforcement—Up to the
Job?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. Pol’y and Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. 83 (2011) (statement of Kumar Kibble, Deputy Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security)). In 2010, that number increased to 3,500. Id.
78. WESTAT REPORT, supra note 13, at 254.
79. See JUDITH GANS, UDALL CTR. FOR STUD. IN PUB. POL’Y, ARIZONA’S ECONOMY AND
THE LEGAL ARIZONA WORKERS ACT 15 (2008) (reasoning that the Westat findings suggest a net
reduction in citizenship status discrimination) (citing WESTAT REPORT, supra note 13).
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1. Underverification
E-Verify underverifies. Database inadequacies and user error create
erroneous failures to confirm a small percentage of employees who are work
authorized. In 2009, 2.6% of employees screened generated a tentative
nonconfirmation response. Of the total number of tentative nonconfirmations,
between 22% and 95% were erroneous.80 The reasons for these errors range from
naming inconsistencies in employee documents (as when an employee’s name is
recorded differently on one authorizing document than another), to data entry
error by the employer, to inaccuracies in the SSA and DHS databases
themselves.81
Erroneous tentative nonconfirmations add uncertainty to the hiring process
for both employers and employees. They may also lead to erroneous final
nonconfirmations. The uncertainty that a tentative nonconfirmation introduces to
the hiring process may lead some employers to use the system to unlawfully
prescreen employees and then fail to inform the employee of the tentative
nonconfirmation notice. E-Verify will then communicate that the employee is not
authorized to work.82
Even if employees are informed of the result, they may not take timely action
to contact SSA or DHS to correct their documents or the information in the
government databases.83 When they do, the process may take considerable time,
require the employee to incur costs, and the employee may encounter bureaucratic
barriers, including receiving a final nonconfirmation if the employee contacted the
agency but failed to specify that the contact related to a nonconfirmation notice.84
Without an appeal process, the employee may experience job loss with no formal
avenue for redress.
One could see this as a fundamentally empirical problem with an empirical
solution, namely, making E-Verify more accurate. This would entail improving
database management to reduce errors in the immigration and citizenship status
database and making technological changes to render the system more discerning
of lawful employees.85
80. See Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 7 (reporting a modeled estimate of a 22% erroneous
TNC rate nationwide and a survey-response-based finding of a 95% erroneous TNC rate in Los
Angeles County) (citing WESTAT REPORT, supra note 13).
81. See Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 6–7; GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 2–3, 19.
82. See Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 6; GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 7–14.
83. See Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 6; GAO REPORT, supra note 46, at 16.
84. See GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 34–38 (“[I]f there is an error in a DHS database,
individuals face formidable challenges in getting the inaccuracy or inconsistency corrected because,
among other things, they have little information about what database led to the decision.”); see also id.
at 34 (explaining that database errors require the employee to file a Privacy Act request to uncover the
error, and “DHS processes Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act requests in the same
manner, and the average response time for these requests in fiscal year 2009 was approximately 104
days”).
85. Id. at 17–19.
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Even if more can be done to decrease erroneous failures to confirm work
authorization due to system inaccuracies, many errors originate outside of
government agencies. Increased accuracy requires reducing employer errors in
using the system. A more daunting project is to motivate work-authorized U.S.
employees to ensure the government has accurate information about them.86 As
with any human system, complete accuracy is impossible.
2. Discrimination
Assuming that E-Verify works well enough to have a substantial impact on
unauthorized employment, it remains open to criticism that it may cause or
exacerbate discrimination. Others have painstakingly detailed the concern that EVerify increases discrimination against people of color, women, and workauthorized noncitizens beyond that resulting from IRCA’s implementation.87
Discrimination may manifest as an unintentional effect of errors in using E-Verify
or as purposeful discriminatory misuse of the system.
Erroneous failures to confirm the work authorization of work-authorized
employees disparately impact women and minorities. Errors in the database
resulting from misspellings of names, name-order reversals, or name changes
during naturalization tend to fall more heavily on employees of color and those
with diverse cultural backgrounds.88 Errors due to name changes resulting from
marriage or divorce disparately impact women.89
E-Verify errors more heavily impact noncitizens and foreign-born U.S.
citizens than native-born U.S. citizens. DHS, which maintains information about
the citizenship status of noncitizens and administers naturalization, generates
more inaccurate failures to confirm work authorization than the SSA, which
verifies the employment eligibility of most native-born U.S. citizens whose
citizenship status is much more stable.90
86. See id. at 20–21 (noting early efforts to educate employers and employees in order to
improve error and correction rates).
87. E.g., Griffith, supra note 13, at 424–26; Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place:
Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 116
(2009); Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and Local Anti-“Alien” Laws and Unity-Rebuilding
Frames for Antidiscrimination Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905, 923–24, 935–36 (2011); Rosenblum,
supra note 59, at 7.
88. Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 7–8; GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 19 (“[I]ndividuals from
certain cultural groups, such as those of Hispanic or Arab origin, may have multiple surnames that are
recorded differently on their naturalization documents than on their Social Security cards. Such names
could be recorded in a different order on the two documents, or one document may contain all the
surnames while the other document may contain an abbreviated version of the surnames.”).
89. See GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 19.
90. See id. at 8–11 (describing how E-Verify queries government databases); WESTAT
REPORT, supra note 13, at 208–12 (setting out error rates that differed depending on whether the
employee was a native born U.S. citizen (0.1%), lawful permanent resident (1.0%), foreign born U.S.
citizen (3.2%), or lawful nonimmigrant, such as a temporary visa holder (5.3%)); Rosenblum, supra
note 59, at 7, 19 nn.26–27 (explaining the difference between SSA and DHS error rates and noting
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Intentional discrimination through misuse of the E-Verify system is also
possible. Employers may purposefully discriminate by unlawfully using E-Verify
to either selectively screen only new hires who they suspect of being unauthorized,
or to prescreen applicants and then fail to hire or notify those who receive
tentative nonconfirmations. Employers who rely on unauthorized employees
could choose not to use E-Verify for that class of workers, or (for the truly
brazen) use E-Verify to discover which applicants receive tentative
nonconfirmations and then hire them, discriminating against those who are workauthorized.91
These avenues of discrimination lead to a larger harm. Cynthia Estlund has
posited that the workplace is one of the most racially integrated places in most
employees’ lives and can therefore act, even in a limited way, as a place where
democratic integration can occur.92 Immigration and national security are two
areas where government actions based on ethnicity and “otherness” are most
visible. If they come to have a greater presence in the workplace, there are two
potential effects. First, when E-Verify’s errors fall more heavily on noncitizens or
employees of color, they can exacerbate employer and coworker perceptions that
employees of color have a precarious or partial status in the United States and by
extension in the workplace.93 Second, it will become more difficult to distinguish
when an employer’s discriminatory acts arise from ordinary bias and when those
acts arise from a desire to comply with the employer’s immigration enforcement
duties.
3. Affirmative Misuse
Looking beyond the direct impact of E-Verify on screened employees, EVerify has also inspired concerns that it will become a vehicle for employers to
misuse the system to gain unfair advantage over employees as a group. This
concern about employer misuse of their immigration screening power echoes
longstanding critiques of IRCA’s employment verification requirements.94 The

that the SSA database is more accurate because of the agency’s longstanding effort to register U.S.
citizen children with the SSA at birth).
91. GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 30, 41; Rosenblum, supra note 5968, at 7, 11.
92. See ESTLUND, supra note 5, at 64–69, 134–39.
93. E.g., Leticia M. Saucedo, Three Theories of Discrimination in the Brown Collar Workplace, 2009 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 345 (2009) (exploring alternative discrimination theories and applying them to the
low-wage immigrant workplace where immigrant workers are perceived as less entitled to work).
94. E.g., Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 540 (2007)
(laying out the ways in which “sanctions rendered undocumented immigrants more vulnerable, less
likely to report violations of minimum wage and other workplace standards, cheaper, and increasingly
resistant to organizing efforts” and stating that sanctions “increased the appeal of undocumented
workers to unscrupulous employers and gave employers a way to derail organizing campaigns in
immigrant-heavy workplaces”); Lee, supra note 37, at 1103, 1138 (2009) (“[E]mployers should be
punished for using their screening authority beyond the scope of its intended use, which often means
employers using reporting and the threat of reporting to avoid liability for labor and employment
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employer sanctions laws gave employers two new government-sanctioned powers
over employees, with the threat of government enforcement behind them. The
first was the power to solicit certain information from employees about their
citizenship or immigration status and to demand evidence in the form of
government-issued documents.
The second was the power to take adverse employment action against
employees based on their response, such as requiring further evidence of work
authorization or terminating employees who did not provide any or adequate
documentation. Critics charged that this acquisition of power and the lack of an
effective scheme to combat discrimination or deter misuse undermined workplace
protections for undocumented workers and therefore for all employees.95
If E-Verify assists ill-intentioned employers to disrupt labor organizing,
depress wages, and circumvent other employment protections, there is a tension
between its immigration enforcement goal and existing workplace protections for
employees. Stephen Lee has framed this tension as a problem of “mission
mismatch.”96 Immigration agencies and employers have different missions, one
that is enforcement-driven and the other profit-driven. By passing the employer
sanctions laws, Congress essentially tasked employers with an immigration
enforcement role in much the way Congress empowers and directs agencies to
take on and fulfill an executive role. This created a danger, however, that
employers would use their immigration powers for their private interest in
increasing profits. Those new powers changed the balance of power between
employer and employee, creating opportunities to decrease wages and other
benefits.97
E-Verify has the potential to exacerbate this problem. That potential is
limited because, in the event of a raid or audit, E-Verify reduces the unscrupulous
employer’s ability to claim uncertainty about the lawful status of its employees.
However, E-Verify provides employers with more information about who on

violations.”); see Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward A Dialectical Model of White-Collar
Crime, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1052 (1990) (“[U]ndocumented workers are particularly prevalent
in industries where competition is intense.”); Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws,
96 GEO. L.J. 777, 821–24 (2008) (describing documented increases in discrimination resulting from
IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions). For comprehensive analyses of the employer sanctions laws,
see Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United
States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955 (1988) (describing the history and consequences of employer
sanctions), Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of
Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737 (2003), Lori A. Nessel,
Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345 (2001), and Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497 (2004).
95. See Gordon, supra note 94 at 540; Lee, supra note 37 at 1103, 1138; Pham, supra note 94 at
821–24.
96. Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089 (2011).
97. See e.g., Gordon, supra note 94 at 539–40.
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their workforce is unauthorized to work, without actually forcing employers to fire
them.98 As a result, the system shifts the already contested balance of power
between employer and employee in ways that may enable undertrained or
unscrupulous employers to misuse the greater information that the system
provides about individual employees.99 In other words, E-Verify gives the
employer a choice. It can pursue the immigration mission or misuse the
information to ensure a more compliant, less costly workforce.
Addressing this kind of employer misuse is challenging. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Office of Special Counsel for
Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices, and private lawsuits enforce
the antidiscrimination laws, including Title VII and the citizenship status and
national origin discrimination protections of IRCA.100 However, those statutes
require a showing that the employer used E-Verify to discriminate because of race,
ethnicity, national origin, or citizenship status, and in the case of citizenship status,
that the discrimination was intentional.101
At present, there is no effective avenue to protect employees from employer
misuse of E-Verify. As the Government Accountability Office reported, the
immigration agency is “not in the position to determine whether employers carry
out activities required by E-Verify, such as posting notice of their participation in
the E-Verify program, providing employees the letter informing them of TNC
findings, or referring employees to the appropriate agency to resolve” a tentative
nonconfirmation.102 Employers are not supposed to take adverse actions in
response to a tentative failure to confirm work eligibility, but immigration officials
are “generally not in the position to determine whether employers engage in
98. Rosenblum, supra note 59 at 14; Fernando Lozano & Todd Sørensen, The Labor Market
Effects of Immigration Reform, 4 POLICY MATTERS 5–6 (2011) (summarizing quantitative literature
exploring employer exploitation of undocumented employees and undertaking an economic study of
the difference in wages resulting from IRCA’s legalization program).
99. Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 14 (noting that E-Verify does not require employers to hire
legal workers, and in fact gives them a “better tool to distinguish between legal and unauthorized
workers”).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2006); see Kati L. Griffith, Response Essay,
ICE Was Not Meant to Be Cold: The Case for Civil Rights Monitoring of Immigration Enforcement at the
Workplace, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1137 (2011) (recommending that the EEOC play a role in educating the
public about the civil rights of employees with respect to immigration enforcement and in monitoring
immigration workplace enforcement activities); Lee, supra note 96 (proposing empowering the
Department of Labor to play a monitoring role in immigration enforcement actions in the workplace);
see also Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Law Enforcement: The Case for
Integrated Protections in the Immigrant Workplace, 38 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 303 (2010 ); Leticia M. Saucedo,
The Browning of the American Workplace: Protecting Workers in Increasingly Latino-ized Occupations, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 303, 318–19 (2004) (advocating cooperation between the DOL, EEOC and USCIS
for the protection of immigrant workers).
101. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2006); but cf. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA RODRÍGUEZ,
IMMIGRATION LAW & POLICY 997 (5th ed. 2009) (critiquing the interpretation of the
antidiscrimination provision as requiring intent).
102. See GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 30.
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activities prohibited by E-Verify, such as limiting the pay of or terminating
employees who receive TNCs, using E-Verify to prescreen job applicants, or
screening employees who are not new hires.”103 Moreover, there are no remedies
under federal law for employees fired or otherwise injured due to the employer’s
failure to meet E-Verify’s worker protection requirements.104
IV. E-VERIFY AND THE CHALLENGE OF DIFFUSE LIBERTY INTERESTS
Looking ahead, E-Verify will almost certainly assume center stage in
comprehensive immigration reform.105 If E-Verify comes into nationwide use,
either through federal legislation or de facto as a result of state mandates, court
challenges are on the horizon.106 These challenges to E-Verify will take many
forms: constitutional arguments, statutory interpretation of IRCA and IRRIRA
among others, and challenges to agency actions. They are likely to raise both
equality and due process themes, either directly as constitutional challenges or
more obliquely as norms that influence statutory interpretation and guide agency
discretion.107
This Part sketches these challenges and the major barriers to their success. It
then evaluates the impact of E-Verify on the liberty interest that mainstream U.S.
workers have in access to work. If immigration enforcement affects citizens in
large numbers, even when the impact to each individual is small, citizens become
engaged in an issue that affects noncitizens and courts may expand the horizon of
their reasoning to the liberty interests of the ordinary citizen. This Part maps these
mainstream interests and then circles back to analyze how those interests overlap
with the interests of the employees whom E-Verify most heavily affects.

103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See Julia Preston, Separate Bills Focus on Two Pieces of Immigration Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, June
16, 2011, at A22 (describing proposed legislation that would expand the use of E-Verify); Daily
Comp. Pres. Docs., 2011 DCPD No. 00479, 12–13 (June 29, 2011) (President Obama expressing
commitment to E-Verify in a news conference); Spencer S. Hsu, Obama Revives Bush Idea of Using EVerify to Catch Illegal Contract Workers, WASH. POST, July 9, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/08/AR2009070800030.html; see also Hiroshi Motomura, What Is
“Comprehensive Immigration Reform”?: Taking the Long View, 63 ARK. L. REV. 225, 227 (2010)
(summarizing prior draft legislation).
106. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985–87 (2011) (upholding state law
requiring Arizona employers to use E-Verify); see id. at 1973 (stating that “[t]he question presented is
whether federal immigration law preempts” a state law that “requires that all Arizona employers use a
federal electronic verification system to confirm that the workers they employ are legally authorized
workers,” and holding that federal law did not preempt the Arizona law).
107. See generally Motomura, supra note 17 (describing indirect approaches to arguments that
successfully raise the interests of migrants outside the law); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545
(1990) (tracing the influence of “phantom” constitutional norms in statutory interpretation).
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A. Equality Arguments and Interest Convergence
Challenges to E-Verify will raise the impact of the program on employees of
diverse ethnicities, cultural backgrounds and citizenship status.108 These challenges
tend to take form as equality arguments or due process challenges or a
combination of both, alleging that the disproportionate impact of E-Verify on
protected classes of employees arbitrarily and unlawfully deprives them of their
livelihood.
A response is the argument that the program reduces discrimination because
when employers use E-Verify properly, screening all employees after hire, they
have no need to rely inappropriately on appearance or accent. Another facet of
this argument is that E-Verify protects low wage jobs often held by U.S.
employees of color.109
Equality arguments also face the intrinsic difficulty of asserting the interests
of a minority against a public good, here the underlying goal of reducing unlawful
migration. By nature, democratic institutions tend to overlook minority interests.
When the costs of E-Verify predictably fall more heavily on minorities, and there
is a perceived benefit to the majority, democratic institutions will inherently lean
toward implementing the majoritarian interest.
Arguments on behalf of discrete minority groups are at their most
compelling when they draw upon the intertwined interests of mainstream U.S.
workers and minority employees.110 If the interests of the U.S. workforce dovetail
with the interests of noncitizens or employees of color, courts and other
policymakers are likely to exhibit greater solicitude for those interests.111 The late
Derrick Bell dubbed this “interest convergence.”112 Hiroshi Motomura has offered

108. See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 2008)
(analyzing claims that E-Verify would increase discrimination and concluding that there was
insufficient proof of heightened discrimination); see also Karla Mari McKanders, The Constitutionality of
State and Local Laws Targeting Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 579, 592–93 (2009)
(analyzing the Chicanos opinion); Shelly Chandra Patel, Note, E-Verify: An Exceptionalist System
Embedded in the Immigration Reform Battle Between Federal and State Governments, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 453, 471–72 (2010) (raising concerns that E-Verify will promote the creation of a concentrated
subordinated class of undocumented immigrants).
109. See Randall G. Shelley, Jr., If You Want Something Done Right . . . : Chicanos Por La Causa v.
Napolitano and the Return of Federalism to Immigration Law, 43 AKRON L. REV. 603, 630–36 (2010)
(arguing that an Arizona law mandating use of E-Verify reduced potential employer liability and
benefitted citizen workers and that concerns about the law leading to discrimination were overstated
and counteracted by protections built in to IRCA).
110. Bell, supra note 16, at 22 (describing the interest-convergence theory).
111. See Motomura, supra note 17, at 1728 (explaining several ways in which unauthorized
migrants may assert “oblique versions of rights that U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents can
exercise in the same settings”).
112. Bell, supra note 16, at 22 (positing that “the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality
is accommodated only when that interest converges with the interests of whites in policy-making
positions” and that this convergence “is far more important to gaining relief than is the degree of
harm suffered by blacks or the character of proof offered to prove this harm”).
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a similar theory specific to noncitizens, demonstrating that successful legal
arguments are those that line up the interests of unauthorized migrants with those
of U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants.113
B. Evaluating the Interests of the Majority
The interests of the majority, then, can be critical to protecting the
overlapping interests of a minority. Understanding these mainstream interests is a
first step to resolving whether the interests of the majority of employees converge
sufficiently with those employees whom E-Verify most heavily impacts. That
interest convergence may inspire a higher level of protection against arbitrary
deprivation of employment.
1. The Mainstream Liberty Interest in Access to Work
Together, E-Verify and IRCA constitute a grand experiment that engages the
entire U.S. workforce in enforcing immigration law, while imposing some costs on
that workforce. Immigration control strategies that impact those outside of the
targeted group of noncitizens traditionally have been associated with U.S. borders,
like the creation of a passport requirement and an inspection system for border
crossings,114 or have imposed short-term impositions on liberties, such as
workplace raids or highway stops.
Assessing the legal implications of IRCA and E-Verify’s inclusion of U.S.
employees in modern immigration enforcement requires evaluating whether the
system makes inroads on a lawfully protected interest. Courts reviewing the
lawfulness of the enforcement strategy may scrutinize the benefits and costs to the
majority in determining whether it imparts adequate due process, provides equal
protection of the law, or constitutes a purely federal scheme that preempts state
involvement.
The at-will employment doctrine undermines claims to a constitutional-style
right to access the workplace. By permitting loss of employment at the irrational
whim of the employer,115 the doctrine complicates the argument that employees
enjoy an entitlement to employment, a fundamental right to work. Equality
arguments framed this way are anemic for another reason. In the usual course of
113. Motomura, supra note 17, at 1728 (“Unauthorized migrants can assert their rights in
practical effect—albeit indirectly and incompletely—by adopting at least five general patterns . . . . All
five patterns allow unauthorized migrants to assert oblique versions of rights that U.S. citizens or
lawful permanent residents can exercise in the same settings.”).
114. See Jeffrey Kahn, How the United States Controlled International Travel Before the Age of
Terrorism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 819, 831 (2011) (tracing the history of the U.S. passport “from a
diplomatic letter of introduction to a license to control mass travel”).
115. B. Glenn George, Justice in Simplicity: Perspectives on Knowledge and Access in American
Employment Law, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 385 (“There is no general or universal protection for
employees that prohibits unfairness or irrational whims in the workplace, unless the employer has
acted with a specific motivation prohibited by statute.”).
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E-Verify implementation, employees are not intentionally selected for
nonconfirmation of employment eligibility on the basis of a protected ground, like
race or sex.
We are left to explore whether a liberty interest in access to work might
spark due process protection. Here too, the lack of an entitlement to work
provides slippery footing for the argument that loss of employment equates to a
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. However, borrowing from
nonattainder literature on blacklists, liberty interests encompass more than the
privilege to do something—a freedom to work. They also include immunity from
being treated in a certain way by the government.116
From that viewpoint, the liberty interest here is the right not to be deprived
of employment through arbitrary government action. Another way of articulating
this is to say that deprivation of the freedom to engage in the lawful behavior of
working requires due process of law if it is to avoid arbitrariness.117 The wrinkle
here is that government does not carry out the deprivation of employment, but
rather gives to another private entity—the employer—a lawful reason to use the
employer’s power to discharge.
2. Aggregating the Risk of Deprivation
Evaluating whether courts or other decision makers will recognize such a
deprivation depends to some extent on the likelihood of harm to mainstream
employees. The risk of harm to the majority of employees as a result of large-scale
implementation of E-Verify falls into two categories. First, E-Verify represents a
risk of arbitrary deprivation of work. Assuming current error rates, it is certain that
some harm will fall improperly on some U.S. workers.
Evaluation of E-Verify tends to consider the implications of the system ex
post, after the database has responded to a records check on an employee. This
Article takes an ex ante perspective, before any employee has taken the risk of
submitting identity and work authorization information to the system. In contrast
to the ex post analysis with its focus on specific harms to individuals or particular
groups such as minorities, the ex ante perspective sheds light on the risks that
national implementation of E-Verify poses to employees as a class.
The risk to any particular individual of erroneous loss of access to work is
very small. As of now, only 2.6% of all new hires receive even a tentative nonconfirmation of their employment status. Statistical modeling has estimated that

116. See Aaron H. Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1203, 1209, 1226
(2010) (“When a government official arbitrarily deprives someone of the freedom to engage in lawful
behavior—even behavior that could be banned by a proper statute, like drinking alcohol—the
deprivation should not occur without due process of law.”).
117. Id.
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between 0.6% and 1.0% (approximately 0.8%) of all E-Verify inquiries resulted in
an erroneous tentative nonconfirmation.118
Even if the risk of error was the same on average for every new employee,
and was not affected by cultural background, gender, or immigration status, an
erroneous nonconfirmation from an individual point of view seems very
unlikely.119 The perception of E-Verify as an immigration program may also
exaggerate that perception of negligible risk—that it is so unlikely as to be beneath
notice.
Even if it were to occur, U.S. workers may feel confident that the error could
be quickly corrected by contacting the appropriate government agency. Given this
frame, most individual U.S. workers will have little incentive to oppose E-Verify.
Multiplied across the population of U.S. employees, however, the harm of EVerify error becomes a large ex post reality for thousands of employees. Errors due
to name mismatches alone (setting aside other types of errors and disregarding
employer misuse of the system) currently would result in 22,512 erroneous initial
failures to confirm work authorization under a national mandate.120 U.S. citizens
would account for 17,098 (76%) of those errors.121 Assuming about 60 million
queries per year, about 164,000 newly hired citizens and noncitizens would receive
an erroneous tentative nonconfirmation related to a name mismatch.122 One
report estimates that at current error rates, national implementation of E-Verify
would result in 600,000 U.S. workers receiving erroneous nonconfirmations per
year.123 A decision to apply E-Verify to all U.S. employees and not just new hires
would multiply that number.124
Moreover, mandatory national use of E-Verify may increase the impact on
employees. Currently the businesses that use E-Verify are disproportionately large.
They are therefore more likely to have human resource departments who can
acquire expertise in using the system and train the personnel responsible for
implementing it. Each has signed a memorandum of understanding with the
government affirmatively agreeing to follow E-Verify’s procedures, which

118. WESTAT REPORT, supra note 13.
119. The risk for those with legal status may increase if E-Verify is nationally mandated,
because the desirability of stolen or borrowed identity documents will also increase. If E-Verify
detects that two people are using the same employment verification information, it will generate a
tentative nonconfirmation for both.
120. GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 19 (“According to USCIS, of 22,512 TNCs resulting
from name mismatches in fiscal year 2009, approximately 76 percent, or 17,098, were for citizens, and
approximately 24 percent, or 5,414, were for noncitizens.”).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 12 (citing GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-08-895T, EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION: CHALLENGES EXIST IN IMPLEMENTING A
MANDATORY ELECTRONIC EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION SYSTEM 10 (June 10, 2008)); WESTAT
REPORT, supra note 13, at 117, 157.
124. GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 19.
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establishes a more positive environment for employer compliance with E-Verify’s
procedures than a legislative decree.
3. Complicating the Risk of Deprivation
Policymakers often face the dilemma of whether to implement solutions that
create some collateral harms. Raising the speed limit from fifty-five to seventy
miles per hour allows many people to travel more quickly from one point to the
other, but at a greater cost in road fatalities. It is tempting to frame the question of
national implementation of E-Verify merely as a policy call about whether the
system is accurate enough.
Two aspects of E-Verify belie the simplicity of framing the issue in that way.
First, unlike a car accident, the harm results from government action itself. It
results from the implementation of the E-Verify program, from errors in its
databases, and from the collateral failures of employers and others. Unlike a speed
limit, which manages an existing risk created by traffic, the risk of an erroneous
firing results directly and solely from the government program.
Second, the challenge here for policymakers such as legislatures, agencies,
and courts, is that the ex post nature of evaluating E-Verify’s impact on U.S.
workers complicates an understanding of how much harm a national mandate
might create. From the ex ante perspective, E-Verify creates a risk to a profoundly
important liberty interest in access to employment. For work-authorized
employees on an individual level, however, that risk is exceedingly small. Gaining
perspective on that risk requires evaluating the aggregate of those individual
interests across the working population as a whole. In pursuit of immigration
enforcement goals, E-Verify creates a very small risk of a significant and
erroneous harm to individual interests in employment, dispersed across a majority
of the population, paired with the larger risk that the harmful error will fall on a
minority of the population.125
Courts and scholars have long noted that when a liberty interest is shared by
many, the costs of organizing large, diffuse constituents can undercut the ability of
that group to protect it.126 Protecting such broadly held interests is especially
difficult when the liberty is not lost, but merely threatened. It is especially

125. See infra notes 130–33.
126. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”); see also JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 151–53 (1980) (analyzing the
meaning of “discrete and insular” in the Carolene footnote); John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse
Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 729–36 (1974) (explaining the Carolene footnote and the
“special scrutiny accorded racial classifications”); Leslie Gentile, Note, Giving Effect to Equal Protection:
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 29 AKRON L. REV. 397, 400 n.22 (1996) (summarizing the equal
protection jurisprudence springing from the Carolene footnote).
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challenging when the risk of that threat materializing is small, contingent, or
distant in time.
This matters for legislatures because, as representatives of the majority, they
are tasked with making decisions based on the best interest of their constituents. It
matters for courts because, according to the interest-convergence theory, failure to
understand the interest of the majority will lead to suboptimal outcomes for both
minorities and the majority.
Although the risk to work-authorized employees is small and may seem
smaller still because of the public perception of E-Verify as an immigration
program, there is reason to believe that the risk of loss of access to work will
impact the public response to E-Verify. Enforcing immigration law using the
mainstream U.S. workforce may precipitate a shift in the public’s perspectives
about immigration control.
Successful efforts to change norms in U.S. civil society have done so by
shifting the focus from the minority that experiences the most concentrated
harms, such as smokers, to the impact on a larger group, such as non-smokers.127
Once the public perceives a safety risk to itself, it becomes a matter of general
concern. If immigration control creates a collateral risk to U.S. workers of job loss
or decline in workplace protections, U.S. employees may object to having that risk
imposed upon them.128 Nor does the risk have to be large to change attitudes.
Research on risk perception has established that awareness of a particular risk is
enough to change attitudes even if the size of the risk is unknown.129
C. The Challenge of Diffuse, Contingent Harms
The risk of an erroneous failure to confirm work authorization is only one
potential harm that national implementation of E-Verify raises. Other more

127. See Jane Aiken & Katherine Goldwasser, The Perils of Empowerment, 20 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 139, 172–75 (2010) (noting that “the problems that arouse the greatest concern
throughout the community are often those that pose, or at least are perceived as posing, a genuine
safety risk to the public at large” and using nonsmoking campaigns as an example); Dan M. Kahan,
Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 632 (2000)
(constructing an incrementalist strategy of norm-changing and describing a backlash against gradual
criminalization of marijuana possession in which “at the point at which the law began to be applied to
white middle-class college students, members of the social mainstream began to object, triggering a
self-reinforcing wave of opposition”) (citing JEROME L. HIMMELSTEIN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF
MARIHUANA: POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY OF DRUG CONTROL IN AMERICA 99–105 (1983)).
128. Aiken & Goldwasser, supra note 127, at 174 (noting that although “Americans consider it
an aspect of their individual freedom to assume personal risks, they have little tolerance for risks that
others impose upon them”) (quoting NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED, SECONDARY SMOKING, INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC SPACE, available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/Views/Exhibit/narrative/
secondary.html).
129. Clinton M. Jenkin, Risk Perception and Terrorism: Applying the Psychometric Paradigm, 2
HOMELAND SECURITY AFF. 1, 1 (2006).
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diffuse and indirect harms pose similar challenges for evaluating the benefits of a
national E-Verify mandate.
The first of these harms is that E-Verify by its nature entails a constriction of
the liberty of every U.S. employee. Outside of immigration law, one of the
freedoms that U.S. citizens and permanent residents traditionally have enjoyed
relates to whether and where they work. This is a freedom from arbitrary
government intrusion into the creation of the employment relationship. We tend
to see the employer, not the government, as the sole gatekeeper of who is hired
and whether employees keep their jobs. Beyond the broad frames that wage and
hour, safety, and other employment laws provide, we accept, for the most part,
some level of coercion from the employer about where we work, when we work,
and what we do there.130 The idea that one must receive permission from the
government to work for a particular employer, however, is not part of the national
consciousness.
All that changed in 1986. When IRCA created employer sanctions and
charged employers with employment eligibility verification, it transformed
relatively private decision making about access to the workplace into a regime in
which the government authorized employees to work. That authorization
necessarily included U.S. citizens. IRCA made the access to employment of every
person contingent on the permission of the U.S. government.
E-Verify takes this a step further by involving the government in each
individual hire. It makes the decision of every employer to hire any employee
contingent on the permission of the U.S. government. The 1986 employer
sanctions laws and the expansion of E-Verify mean that the government can, in
the national interest, trump an employer’s choice about who to hire if that choice
implicates who may enter the country and who may leave.
Few employees think of it that way. E-Verify will change that, making visible
to the public IRCA’s transformation of the government’s role in authorizing
access to work. As the computer receives and examines the employee’s
information, E-Verify brings DHS virtually into every workplace. It makes DHS
an active participant in deciding whether employees keep their jobs.
The second of these diffuse and indirect effects of implementing E-Verify
nationally is that it will normalize the role of government in using access to the
workplace as a legitimate location for law enforcement. Outside of immigration
enforcement, when the government steps into the workplace it is usually on the
side of the employee in the form of employment discrimination laws, worker
safety regulations, or labor protections. When the government-centered
framework of immigration law meets up with the mainstream employee’s
experience of the workplace as relatively free from government coercion, the

130. This coercion is limited, of course, to the extent that employees have the freedom to quit
or the bargaining power to negotiate these terms, either individually or collectively.
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nature of the workplace alters. The role of government becomes very visible when
employment encounters immigration enforcement.
A third effect of E-Verify is in providing a new role in immigration
enforcement to a set of powerful actors: the states. The growing trend for states to
require employers to use E-Verify is a pathway for states to claim a greater role in
the social control of migrants through a larger presence in the creation of the
employment relationship. This means that states will take a greater part in
employees’ access to work and in decisions about who the employer hires or
retains. These laws use employment as a means of furthering other enforcement
goals and perhaps reflect underlying concerns about the changing racial and ethnic
demographics within and around state borders.
Fourth, Estlund’s work on the democratic value of integration suggests
another overlapping interest.131 If, as she suggests, the workplace is where most
American employees experience the greatest racial integration, protecting the
workplace from discriminatory harms that undermine that integration becomes a
mainstream value. That mainstream value lines up with the interests of minority
groups. Mainstream employees and minorities have an overlapping interest in
ensuring that immigration enforcement vehicles like E-Verify do not undermine
the potential of the workplace for continued racial integration.
E-Verify raises a final potential harm, one that is still more difficult to
evaluate because it represents a future contingency. David Cole has written about
how immigration law often acts as the wedge for government curtailment of
mainstream liberty.132 The role of the agencies in charge of E-Verify is
immigration enforcement, but the mission of DHS is broader than immigration.
Its central focus is national security. What E-Verify provides to DHS is
information about every U.S. employee who passes through the computerized
system. It may be tempting, at some future point, to use that information or EVerify’s call-in apparatus for purposes beyond immigration enforcement.
These harms, even more than the ex ante evaluation of the empirical risk of
error and the concerns about employer misuse, are unquantifiable and follow only
indirectly from national implementation of E-Verify. Identifying these harms does
not answer the question of whether E-Verify should remain a voluntary program
or become a national mandate. They are, nonetheless, factors that should enter
into the national conversation about E-Verify because they are likely to have a
widespread effect on the population of U.S. employees. National implementation
of E-Verify will have national impact. Naming these harms makes clear that EVerify is not just an immigration enforcement program, but a passage through
which law enforcement may permeate the workplace.

131.
132.

See supra notes 92 and accompanying text.
David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 957 (2002).
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article does not answer the larger questions of whether national
implementation of E-Verify is constitutional, or politically feasible, or even a good
idea. Its humbler aspiration is to enable a more nuanced dialogue about the
program by shifting some attention to the mainstream employees who will be the
most numerous group affected by E-Verify’s effort to carry out its immigration
enforcement mission.
To the extent that mainstream interests differ from those of the
undocumented workers that E-Verify targets or the groups that E-Verify most
disparately impacts, the impact of E-Verify on the majority of employees may
shed light on immigration enforcement approaches that similarly engage groups
larger than the targeted group. In the same way that the prevalence of the passport
for international travel and the rise of border control reimagined the U.S.
geography as a space enclosed by a thickly lined boundary,133 E-Verify and
employer sanctions could transform the workplace into a conscious locus of
immigration control in which the potential for unlawful status becomes
forefronted among employees and employers.
As E-Verify comes into nationwide use, either by way of a federal legislative
or regulatory mandate or through the expansion of state laws mandating that
public and private employers use the system, it will transform the way all
employees—citizens and noncitizens—perceive of their access to employment. It
will enlarge mainstream understandings of who plays a role in whether someone
gets a job, expanding the cast of decision makers beyond the employer. It formally
redesignates the workplace as inhabited not just by employer and employees, but
also by government and its concerns about immigration and national security.
E-Verify, together with IRCA, acts as a portal for governments—federal and
state—to have a stronger presence at the inception of the employment
relationship. At the same time, it gives employers greater powers to choose
whether to use the E-Verify results only for immigration enforcement or also for
their own goals. At bottom, then, it gives employers, the federal government, and
the states a greater scope of power over access to employment. That creates a
concomitant loss of freedom for all employees.
Work is central to belonging in our society.134 This Article began by setting
out a few of its functions: to generate income, to sustain ourselves and family,

133. See Kahn, supra note 114, at 841 (discussing the role of the passport in initiating controls
at the U.S.-Mexico border).
134. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 101 (1991)
(situating the “right to earn” as critical to the sense of belonging to American society); Shannon
Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for Worker Claims Making, 35
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 591–92 (summarizing the results of a study of undocumented workers in
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obtain goods, and enhance our leisure time. Work also has social and personal
meaning. If it is true that work is one of the most racially integrated places in our
society, and therefore has the potential to further democratic integration, then we
should be very careful about how we allow the government to use the delicate
moment when work begins.

California and Texas restaurants and concluding that the undocumented respondents saw their
“position in the United States as based on an understanding that they will work harder and longer
than other Americans”).

